We use a generalized version of the Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem to study ine ciencies in bilateral bargaining over trade of an indivisible good, where there is two sided private information on the valuations. We show that when preferences are convex and quasi linear, and when the private information represents the magnitude of the utility gain or loss and follows a uniform distribution, that the most e cient mechanism always exhibits a bias towards the status quo. In the case that utility functions are quadratic in the amount traded, we prove that for any incentive compatible direct mechanism, the expected direction of the ine ciencies is towards the disagreement point. In other words, for the class of preferences we study, there is a strategic advantage to property rights in the Coase bargaining setup in the presence of incomplete information.
Introduction
We consider the problem of bilateral trade of a divisible good, when there is two sided incomplete information about the valuations. The questions we ask are whether in such a case there will be ine ciencies, and if so, whether there is any bias in the direction of the ine ciencies. This is of course not a new problem. The Myerson-Satterthwaite (MS) theorem and its corollary identify conditions under which bilateral trading leads to ine ciency. In this paper we generalize the MS theorem, investigate the direction of ine ciency when there is no e cient equilibrium, and apply the results to the Coase theorem.
Generalization of the MS Theorem. The original MS theorem is for an indivisible good, or equivalently for the case where the good is divisible but utilities are linear. We generalize the theorem to non-linear utilities and a divisible good. The generalization is straightforward and follows closely the proof of the original theorem.
Direction of Ine ciency. Next we investigate, when there is no fully e cient Bayesian equilibrium (BE), whether there is a systematic bias in the direction of the ine ciency. Such a systematic bias is readily apparent from the MS theorem for the simple case of an indivisible good in a bargaining process with ex post individual rationality (IR). With ex post IR, there will never be a trade when the buyer's value is less than the seller's cost, because such a trade would would contradict IR for one or both of the traders. Thus all the examples of ine ciency must be \in the direction of the disagreement point," examples where the buyer's value is more than the seller's cost but the good is ine ciently not traded.
For the case of a divisible good, it is not so obvious that ine ciencies must lead to a bias in the direction of the status quo (too little trade). In this case, the e cient trade can be an interior point, and ine ciencies could arise from either trading too little or trading too much. In section 3 we prove a version of the bias result in the the case of a divisible good where utilities are concave, where the private information represents the magnitude of the gain or loss, and where the private information follows a uniform distribution. In particular, if there is no fully e cient BE, the most e cient BE has the following bias: the equilibrium amount traded will never be more than the e cient amount of trade and will sometimes be less than the e cient amount. The situation for other BE besides the most e cient one is more complicated: It is possible to construct BE where the equilibrium amount traded is more than the e cient amount for some types. However, in Section 4, we show that if utilities are quadratic, that for every BE, the expected amount of trade is less than the expected e cient amount of trade.
Application to the Coase Theorem. The Coase theorem says that when property rights are well de ned and enforced and when there are no transaction costs, direct bargaining over the amount of an environmental harm will lead to (A) e ciency and (B) neutrality (the amount of the harm will be the same no matter which way the rights were initially allocated). As noted by Fudenberg and Tirole (1992, p 279) , the original MS theorem is in apparent con ict with (A), the e ciency claim of the Coase theorem. The generalization of the MS theorem suggests that the con ict continues to exist when there are non-linear utilities and a divisible harm, and our investigation of the direction of ine ciency suggests a con ict with (B), the neutrality claim. For example, when rights are allocated to the victim, strategic use of private information appears to lead toward less pollution than is e cient, and when rights are allocated toward the polluter strategic use of private information appears to lead to less abatement (and hence more pollution) than is e cient.
These results imply that the Coase theorem does not extend to the environment of private information. In a separate experimental paper (McKelvey and Page 1997) we estimate the amount of ine ciency and the strength of its bias toward the disagreement point in a speci c game form. We nd that both are substantial and the bias is in the predicted direction.
Other literature has considered the e ects of private information in the Coase Theorem. Samuelson 1984] argues that in the indivisible good case that ine ciencies can be expected. Farrell 1987] considers a case of a divisible good with quadratic utility and argues that in the presence of private information that one can achieve e cient incentive compatible mechanisms, but not if voluntary participation is required. Illing 1992] considers a divisible good with quadratic utility similar to the one considered in section 4 of this paper, and shows that under a particular game form, that ine ciency arises and distorts the outcome in the direction of the status quo. The above papers are for bilateral bargaining. Mailath and Postlewaite 1990] show that for n-person bargaining over an indivisible good, that the probability of an e cient action goes to zero. We only consider bilateral bargaining. Our contribution to the literature on the Coase Theorem is to show that for the case of an indivisible good, at least for the quadratic case considered in the literature, ine ciencies can be expected to occur for any Bayes equilibrium, regardless of the game for that is used, and that these ine ciencies have a bias towards the status quo. 
1 Alternatively, in the Coasian context studied later, under victim's rights, the buyer can be though of as the polluter, and the seller as the victim, x the amount of pollution, and y the transfer. Under polluter's rights, the buyer is the victim, the seller is the polluter, and x the amount of abatement. (4) where f and g are twice continuously di erentiable real valued functions on X B, and X C, respectively, satisfying f(0; b) = g(0; c) = 0 for all b; c, and P and Q are the cumulative density functions of absolutely continuous measures on the space of types of each agent. We let p and q be the corresponding density functions of P and Q.
The two agents attempt to come to an agreement on a point (x; y) 2 Z. If they fail to agree, they get the disagreement point (0; 0). We do not specify a particular extensive form game. Rather we characterize the allocations that can arise as a Bayesian equilibrium to any extensive form game. Using the revelation principle, it is su cient to consider direct mechanisms, of the form (x; y) = (x(b; c); y(b; c)) : B C 7 ! Z, and to characterize the set of incentive compatible individually rational direct mechanisms.
The Myerson-Satterthwaite theorem 1983, theorem 1] characterizes the BE for bilateral trade of an indivisible good with incomplete information about the valuations. We are interested in an environment where goods are divisible and preferences of individuals need not be linear over the amount of the good. So we begin by proving an extended version of the original MS result that applies to this environment. Theorem 2 (Generalization of MS, Theorem 1, part 2) Assume individual utility functions and information are as in (1) -(4). Then for any x 2 X a su cient condition for there to exist a y 2 X such that (x; y) is a direct mechanism satisfying IC and interim
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This section explores the direction of ine ciency, or \bias". We consider the bias of the maximally e cient BE, when there is no e cient BE.
We consider only the case where f(x; b) = b f(x); and g(x; c) = c g(x) for some f; g: We assume that the distribution of b and c are both uniform over 0; 1]. In other words, P(b) = b; and Q(c) = c. Since we assumed that f(x; b) = g(x; c) = 0 for all b; c, it follows that f(0) = 0 and g(0) = 0. We make the additional assumptions that f 0 (x) 0; with strict inequality for x < x H , g 0 (x) 0; with strict inequality for x > 0, and f 00 < 0; g 00 > 0:
Under the above assumptions, The rst problem is solved by pointwise maximization, yielding x = x (b; c).
Recall from equation (5) Depending on the value of (b; c) this leads to one of three cases:
Case 1 In the region of (b; c) for which there is an interior solution (0 < x o < x H ), of (27), a necessary for x to be a solution is,
(1 
The quadratic case has been used in the literature on the Coase Theorem 3 . In this interpretation, we can think of the buyer as the polluter, the seller as the victim, and the property rights as being assigned to the victim. Property rights in this framework are represented by the location of the disagreement point, or status quo. We have assumed that the disagreement point is at the point (0; 0), which is at the value of x = 0; y = 0 corresponding to the ideal point that can be enforced by the victim, if the victim can choose the level of x.
To consider the case where property rights are assigned to the polluter, we would change the disagreement point to the point (1; 0) where x = x H = 1, corresponding to the ideal point of the polluter. But with a lump sum tax of b to the polluter, and a lump sum subsidy of c to the victim (which does not change the Bayes equilibria of the game), 
where z = 1 ? x is the amount of abatement, and t = ?y is the transfer from victim to polluter. Setting the disagreement point to be the point z = 0; t = 0: we see that the case where the property rights are assigned to the polluter is formally equivalent to the case of victim rights, were we simply reverse the roles of the victim and the polluter. Because of this symmetry of the two rights assignments, it is only necessary to consider one case. If we show that there is a bias towards the disagreement point in the case of victim rights, polluter rights will lead to a corresponding bias towards the disagreement point that can be enforced with polluter rights. Hence, a status quo bias in the framework of the quadratic model of equation (30) implies that there is a bias of the equilibrium level of pollution in the direction of the holder of the property rights.
In the quadratic case, we are able to show that all BE (not just the maximally ecient one) have a bias towards the status quo, yielding a strategic advantage to property rights:
Proposition 1 We can interpret these as implications about the allocations that can arise in the Bayes equilibria (BE) of any bargaining game with quadratic payo s as in (14). Then 
Proof of Proposition, part B
It follows from Corollary 1 that if (x; y) 2 X X satis es IC and IR, then we must have M(x) 0. Hence, to show that the expected x is less than the e cient x, it su ces to show that if the expected x is greater than or equal to the e cient x, then we can't obtain M(x) 0. So let X be the set of integrable functions on T 
We will show that the value of the objective function at the solution to this optimization problem is negative. 
The mechanisms identi ed by the proposition are not necessarily unique. For a nite approximation to the game with preferences as used in the proposition, we have computed three di erent incentive compatible, direct mechanisms, x; that satisfy the conditions of the proposition. In all three mechanisms, there are fairly frequent cases of bargaining breakdown. The three mechanisms varied in the rate of bargaining breakdown, with rates of 5, 10, 14 percent, respectively. We were also able to construct a mechanism satisfying the conditions of the proposition for which x(b; c) is greater than the e cient x for some values of b and c; (although on average x was less than the average e cient x). Also, we should note that even in a given mechanism, there may be Bayes Equilibria other than truth telling. 
